Image of power

REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RATINGS IN LATIN AMERICA
JANUARY - FEBRUARY 2023
Presidential image rankings

January - February 2023

These rankings include cases where a minimum of three measurements are available over the study period from at least two different sources. Unclear answers (“neither approve nor disapprove” or “regular”) are not counted.

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on a compilation of public opinion surveys carried out between January and February 2023. To see the sources: click here
Evolution of presidential approval in Latin America
2020-2023

Argentina: Alberto Fernández

Bolivia: Jeanine Añez | Luis Arce

Brazil: Jair Bolsonaro | Lula da Silva

Chile: Sebastián Piñera | Gabriel Boric

*Arce took office Nov. 8, 2020

*Boric took office Mar. 11, 2022

Source: Author's own elaboration based on a compilation of public opinion surveys carried out between January 2020 and February 2023. To see the sources: click here. (*) Based on a single data source. Vertical dotted lines indicate the change of government.
Evolution of presidential approval in Latin America 2020-2023

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Evolution of presidential approval in Latin America 2020-2023

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Evolution of presidential approval in Latin America 2020-2023

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Panama: Laurentino Cortizo

Paraguay: Mario Abdo Benitez

Peru: M. Vizcarra | F. Sagasti | P. Castillo | D. Boluarte

Dominican Republic: Danilo Medina | Luis Abinader


Evolution of presidential approval in Latin America 2020-2023

**Uruguay: Luis Lacalle Pou**

- Jan-Feb '20: 53%
- Mar-Apr: 65%
- May-Jun: 61%
- Jul-Aug: 61%
- Sep-Oct: 60%
- Nov-Dec: 58%
- Jan-Feb '21: 61%
- Mar-Apr: 62%
- May-Jun: 61%
- Jul-Aug: 61%
- Sep-Oct: 60%
- Nov-Dec: 58%
- Jan-Feb '22: 55%
- Mar-Apr: 57%
- May-Jun: 53%
- Jul-Aug: 52%
- Sep-Oct: 56%
- Nov-Dec: 52%
- Jan-Feb '23: 55%

**Venezuela: Nicolás Maduro**

- Jan-Feb '20: 83%
- Mar-Apr: 57%
- May-Jun: 54%
- Jul-Aug: 82%
- Sep-Oct: 83%
- Nov-Dec: 53%
- Jan-Feb '21: 14%
- Mar-Apr: 15%
- May-Jun: 14%
- Jul-Aug: 13%
- Sep-Oct: 28%
- Nov-Dec: 13%

Source: Author’s own elaboration based on a compilation of public opinion surveys carried out between January 2020 and February 2023. To see the sources: [click here](#). (*) Based on a single data source. Vertical dotted lines indicate the change of government.
Evolution of the presidential image between January and February

The following graph shows the evolution of the presidential image throughout the period and the variability of the measurements, marked with dots of different colors according to the month in which they were taken. The descending line to the right indicates a fall and the ascending line to the left indicates growth.

Guillermo Lasso's popularity keeps falling uninterruptedly, especially after the electoral defeats suffered during the month of February. On the other hand, Lula Da Silva's approval level has seen a slight increase after his second month in office (+3%).

Source: Author's own elaboration based on a compilation of public opinion surveys carried out between January and February 2023. To see the sources: click here.
The "model" of the authoritarian leader showing results

Democracies around the world are in retreat. The advances observed until the early 2000s, driven in large part by the famous democratic spring that began in the 1980s, have been frozen.

V-DEM’s latest report on democracy, “Challenges Facing the Advance of Authoritarianism,” already anticipates in its title the challenges that political systems have been facing over the last ten years.

Worldwide, the quality of elections has deteriorated in no less than 30 countries and freedom of expression in 35. Censorship of the media has worsened in 47 countries and attacks on civil society organizations have become harsher in 37 countries.

Within this panorama, Latin America is no exception. During the 20th century, authoritarian intrusions were repeated in the region. However, what we are seeing now are more endogenous and gradual political dynamics. In this context, the very weakness of government institutions and the traditional channels of political representation, together with their growing social discredit, have made room for the emergence of leaderships with electoral backing that seek to validate authoritarian drifts from spaces of institutional responsibility with the letter of urgent citizen demands.

The statistics that show the effectiveness of this policy in terms of reducing insecurity and the territorial reach of gangs, added to the high presidential approval (90% according to CID Gallup) is a challenge for politicians and analysts who seek, without much success, to reconcile this with the also very concrete concerns about the human rights situation in the country, the deterioration of the rule of law and the lack of access to public information.

Another survey conducted in February on the perception of the state of emergency shows that 84% of those polled consider that the country is moving in the right direction and that 94% agree with the measures taken against the main gangs in the country. Long before reaching this point, Bukele had already revealed and started working on the legal bases to fight for a safe re-election but which the Salvadoran Constitution expressly forbids.

The big question is whether Nayib Bukele can end up becoming a model of leadership, borderline in democratic terms but showing results. In other words, a model that accepts that sometimes democratic costs “are inevitable” in order to do what needs to be done and what the citizenry needs.

As we have been analyzing in previous issues, insecurity is an ever-present issue in the concerns of citizens. In Ecuador, Peru and Chile, more than 70% of the people surveyed by CID GALLUP in January perceive that insecurity increased in the previous four months. At the opposite extreme is - precisely - El Salvador. More striking is the case of Honduras, which at the beginning of December was under a state of emergency due to criminal acts attributed to organized crime.

El Salvador is a paradigmatic case in this regard. This March marks one year since the beginning of the state of emergency and Nayib Bukele has celebrated the achievements of his security policy against criminal gangs with images of a mega-prison with capacity to hold some 40,000 detainees.
Ecuador leads the ranking with a perception of increased insecurity of 85%. As we have been analyzing in Image of Power, in recent months there have been a series of regional declarations of state of emergency due to the increase in violence, the growing virulence of prison conflicts and clashes between cartels and organized criminal groups. In this context, Guillermo Lasso, who today is positioned as the most unpopular president in the region, has looked with sympathy at the path taken by Bukele, although for the moment he has opted to free - by decree - the carrying and possession of weapons for personal defense.

Meanwhile, in Chile, the president has just announced a 40% real increase in the public budget allocated to all security functions. In addition, a law has just been published that seeks to strengthen the exercise of police and Gendarmerie functions by increasing penalties for actions against the life and integrity of agents and revises the scope of the principle of legitimate self-defense.

**Figure 2. Perceptions of increased insecurity in Latin America**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Perception of Increased Insecurity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamá</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Dominic...</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>México</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CID-Gallup, enero 2023.*
B r a z i l :  a l m o s t  1 0 0  d a y s  i n t o  h i s  t e r m ,  L u l a  f a c e s  c h a l l e n g e s  i n  t h e  l e g i s l a t u r e

On February 1, a month after Lula’s inauguration, the new deputies and senators from the October 2022 elections were sworn in. On the same day, the chambers elected their respective heads and, as expected, Rodrigo Pacheco in the Senate and Arthur Lira in the Chamber of Deputies were reelected, both strategic actors in the configuration of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches.

Lula pushed hard for Pacheco, a member of the DEM party and senator for Minas Gerais, and achieved his reelection after arduously negotiating the 49 votes that revalidated him in office. It was very different in the case of Arthur Lira, reelected with a record 464 votes.

The chambers today are comprised as follows:

Figure 3. Composition of the Brazilian Senate, 2023

It remains to be seen how the Executive-Legislative are going to work out. There is no doubt that it will be a great challenge for the ruling coalition, both within the alliance composed of more than 10 parties, as well as outside it. For the moment, Lula is finding it difficult to validate in the legislature his first provisional measures, among them those seeking to relaunch a series of social programs such as Bolsa Família - MP 1164 (MP = Provisional Measure), Auxílio Brasil (MP 1155), Minha Casa Minha Vida (MP 1162) and a proposal to grant more credit to the Ministry of Social Assistance, Family and Fight against Hunger (MP 1169).

Provisional measures are decrees with the force of law that the President has the power to issue in cases of necessity and urgency. They are valid for a maximum of 120 days (60 days plus an extension for the same term), although they may become law if approved by Congress. Once the first 45 days of its publication have elapsed without treatment, the MP blocks the voting agenda of the Chamber in which it is being processed, which means that the Chamber may only vote on some types of initiatives (supplementary bills, legislative decree bills, resolution bills and bills that are not subject to provisional measures) in an extraordinary session. The 16 provisional measures that Lula has issued so far are still being processed.
A brief legislative overview of the region

In a context of growing tensions with the Central Bank due to the high interest rate that almost reached 14%, the government announced at the end of March a proposal for a new fiscal rule that intends to modify the reform carried out during the presidency of Michel Temer. The proposal aims to establish an annual growth of spending limited to 70% of the variation of income in the previous 12 months, as well as a floor and a ceiling for the real growth of spending of 0.6% and 2.5% per year, respectively.

What is happening in the congresses of Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay

**Argentina.** On March 1, President Alberto Fernandez formally opened the ordinary session, the last of his administration - against a complex backdrop of the approaching elections in October this year and the country's enduring economic and political struggles.

The reajournment of the session was preceded by a schism in the Senate ruling bloc, with five MPs striking out to create the break-away Unidad Federal, leaving Frente de Todos with only 31 seats (those corresponding to Frente Nacional y Popular and Unidad Ciudadana). In comparison, Unión Cívica Radical, Frente PRO and other minority blocs hold a combined 55 seats.

**Figure 5. Composition of the Argentine Senate, 2023**

The electoral context, marked by polarization and political fragmentation, suggests legislative activity - already in decline - is set to become even more sluggish in the coming months. The last ordinary legislative year saw only 37 laws being passed and 26 sessions, among the lowest since the return of democracy. There was, however, more work happening at the committee level, which suggests that the enactment of laws required more dialogue and negotiation between blocs. (For more information, we invite you to consult our last [Legislative Balance of the Congress of Argentina](https://example.com).

The measurement of some indicators of the relationship between the executive and the legislature also shows that, to date, the government of Alberto Fernández has presented fewer bills compared with the previous four governments, and that roughly the same proportion of these bills have been approved as when Mauricio Macri was in office despite Macri enjoying less support across the parliament. During the same period, the number of decrees of ‘necessity and urgency’ has gone up - thus far the prevalence of the so-called DNUs exceeding the annual average for the past 20 years.

**Figure 6. Necessity and Urgency Decrees issued in Argentina between 1999 and 2022**

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Source: [Political and Institutional Map of Latin America (MPIAL)](https://example.com) from Directorio Legislativo.
A brief legislative overview of the region

**Uruguay.** On March 1, Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou, held the accountability of the Executive Branch before the Legislative Branch, in which the ruling coalition has a simple majority in both chambers. In a context in which parliamentary activity has been declining in terms of the number of sessions held and bills presented, important debates are expected, among them the debate of an ambitious tax reform and pending reforms to the pension system.

The following graphs show the evolution of parliamentary activity since the beginning of Lacalle Pou’s government in March 2020.

- A total of 247 laws were passed: 76 in 2020, 83 in 2021 and 88 in 2022.

**Figure 7. Laws enacted in Uruguay between 2020 and 2022**

- Almost 850 bills were submitted from March 2020 and January 2023. As observed with the sessions, activity decreased very gradually over the period: from 324 in 2020, to 304 in 2021 and 214 in 2022.

**Figure 8. Plenary sessions held by the Uruguayan Assembly between 2020 and 2022**

**Chile.** The second year of Gabriel Boric’s government began with the rejection of his first tax reform in the Chamber of Deputies and the second renewal of his cabinet since he assumed the presidency, which on this occasion involved the change of the leadership in five ministries (Foreign Affairs, Public Works, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology).

Tax reform was a central point of the government's agenda and was aimed at increasing tax collection (3.6% of GDP in four years) to finance the expansion of the social protection system. To this end, it was proposed to modify the Tax Code, the Income Tax and to create a new wealth tax.

It should be remembered that in Chile the two legislative chambers are highly fragmented. The different political forces that compose it today are configured around a heterogeneous alliance of left/center-left parties that accompanies the government, the Chile Vamos coalition that groups right/center-right spaces and other blocs. This fragmentation has been seen in the rejection of several initiatives, such as the one mentioned above, and in the complexity of the negotiations.
In the case of the tax reform, the vote was defined with 73 votes in favor, 71 against and three abstentions. It fell because the sum of positive votes is less than the sum of negative votes and abstentions.

How has the Congress been working so far in Gabriel Boric’s government?

- As of February 2023, 147 laws were passed, 25 more than the average number of initiatives approved per year during the last government of Sebastián Piñera (2018-2021).

Colombia. At the end of March, the political reform promoted by Gustavo Petro’s government was shipwrecked, its first major parliamentary setback. As we reported in our last issue, the debate had begun in 2022, managing to complete the first four of the eight debates that correspond to the treatment of a constitutional amendment.

The proposal contemplated several particularly sensitive issues: the replacement of preferential voting by closed, blocked and parity lists; 100% state financing of political campaigns; and the annulment of the power of the Attorney General’s Office to sanction or dismiss political officials who have been elected by popular vote. Other changes that were under debate were to reduce the age requirement to become a legislator from 30 to 25 years old; to enable congressmen to run for governorships and mayorships without having to resign their seats one year before the elections, and to change their party only once; and to eliminate the restriction imposed by the 2015 constitutional reform that reserves the possibility of forming alliances for smaller parties that in total do not gather more than 15% of the votes in the previous elections.
A brief legislative overview of the region

The debate was leaving several of the most important points along the way, or else, raising others that in the interest of finding agreements with other blocks were changing the physiognomy of the original bill. The coup de grâce was the elimination of closed and parity lists, and the state financing of campaigns. At that point, Senate President Roy Barreras asked the government to withdraw a bill that "no longer made any sense", which happened on March 23. The Minister of the Interior Alfonso Prada declared that it is planned to reintroduce it, although this would not happen until 2024.

It was also Barreras who asked the national government to interrupt all dialogue with the Gulf Clan in the framework of the Total Peace proposal which aims, fundamentally, to achieve a ceasefire and the regularization of the so-called FARC dissidences. In this regard, he stated that "such intermediations [with drug traffickers] have harmed the noble purpose of the president, Gustavo Petro, to achieve a Total Peace and are unnecessary. Let's approve the law of submission and let them accept it".

The "law of submission to justice for criminal gangs" was filed by the ministries of Justice and Interior in mid-March. It establishes that these structures will have to accept their criminal responsibility for all the crimes they have committed, hand over information on their criminal patterns, offer reparations to their victims, in exchange for effective sentences of 6 to 8 years in prison and 4 years of probation. Along with this, other reforms in the labor, social security and health areas will also be processed, which are also expected to be the subject of tough negotiations.

It should be recalled that at the end of February, Barreras announced his decision to leave the Alianza Democrática Amplia bloc and the creation of a new force called “La Fuerza de la Paz”, from which he is promoting different candidates for the regional elections to be held at the end of October.
On April 30 there are general elections in Paraguay. At stake are the presidential tickets for the period 2023-2028, the composition of the Senate (45 incumbents, 30 substitutes) and of the Chamber of Deputies (80 incumbents, 80 substitutes), 17 governorships, and the incumbent and substitute members of the Departmental Boards.

This electoral process will be marked by different factors:

- These are the first national legislative elections using the preferential voting system approved in 2019. That means the electoral lists come without a preestablished order of candidates: the voter has to choose a list and, within it, the candidate of his or her preference. The seats are then distributed by means of the D'Hondt System, however, once the number of seats corresponding to each party is established the lists will be reordered according to the number of preferential votes received by each of its members.

- The Superior Court of Electoral Justice has allowed for the participation of a record number of tickets (13) since Paraguay’s return to democracy. They include traditional and new political forces, among the latter two radicalized right-wing options (Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos and Partido de la Juventud, led by ex-football player José Luis Chilavert) and the independent anti-establishment candidate Paraguayo Cubas.

Measurements indicate that the favorites in the presidential race are Partido Colorado and Concertación Nacional, an alliance of Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico and 13 other minor parties. In the Colorado camp - the ‘Coloradists’ - frictions from the primaries still persist following the victory of Santiago Peña, backed by former president Horacio Cartes, over Arnoldo Wiens. The opposition, meanwhile, is more unified as a result of the overwhelming support for Efraín Alegre in the primaries (with Soledad Nuñez as running mate). In an election whose winner will be decided in a single round and by means of a simple majority, a recent poll puts Alegre and Peña virtually neck and neck with respective voter intentions 38% vs. 36%.

Source: Own elaboration based on survey data collected.
Guatemala: Supreme electoral court clears the way for two controversial candidates

On June 25, citizens will go to the polls to elect the new president, the 160 members, mayors and members of the 340 municipal councils of the country, and the 20 representatives of the country to the Central American Parliament.

However, the run-up to the elections has been controversial. In recent months the Supreme Electoral Court has been criticized for arbitrarily accepting or annulling certain candidates casting doubt over the integrity of the process.

Among these, Zury Ríos, daughter of former dictator Efraín Ríos Montt and candidate for the Coalition Valor-Unionista, and Sandra Torres, former first lady and candidate for the party Unión Nacional de la Esperanza, stand out. In the 2019 presidential elections, Ríos had been disqualified from running by the Constitutional Court for being a relative of a person implicated in a coup. However, after the court was reformed in 2021 with the backing of the ruling party, this was revoked, allowing her to stand. In the case of Torres (who won the first electoral round of 2019 only to lose out to Alejandro Giammattei in the second), she too has been allowed to run despite the fact that his running mate, Romeo Guerra, is an evangelical pastor and so banned by law from participating in elections.

As for those that have been prevented from taking part, the most notable cases are those of Thelma Cabrera-Jordan Rodas (for Movimiento para la Liberación de los Pueblos, a peasant-indigenous party) and Roberto Arzú (the son of a former president, who was running for the right wing Podemos party).

The electoral landscape was also influenced by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, which filed a request for impeachment against Cabal’s presidential candidate, Edmond Mulet, requesting that his immunity be withdrawn under accusations of obstructing the investigation of a case against journalist Rubén Zamora.

How has this affected the presidential race?
According to the recent CID Gallup poll, it is currently a two-horse race with Zury Ríos and Sandra Torres both with about 20% backing. Trailing them are Arzú (13%), Mulet (10%) and Cabrera (7%).

These numbers place all candidates very far from the required 50% threshold to win outright in the first round. Also, the prospect of an alliance being forged between Torres and other political forces has grown dimmer after a number of them have been blocked by the electoral court.
Bolivia: tension grows in MAS

The dispute between Evo Morales and Luis Arce for the control of MAS has been intensifying in the last months. Tempers frayed due to the economic crisis, the Bolivian peso suffered an unprecedented depreciation against the dollar. The financial and social unrest caused by the scarce availability of foreign currency led Morales to urge Arce to make changes in the cabinet. The president, for his part, responded with reticence, calling for party unity and to avoid internal rifts that could favor the opposition forces.

This friction between the renovating wing, which pushes for a generational change in the party leadership in view of the 2025 elections, and the radical wing, which supports a new candidacy of Evo, heats up an already volatile and highly polarized scenario.

Let us recall that on December 30, the governor of Santa Cruz and opposition leader, Luis Fernando Camacho, was arrested after being accused of terrorism crimes during the events that in 2019 led to the resignation of Evo Morales. The four-month preventive detention was dictated due to the existence of flight risk and obstruction of justice, although his defense alleged political motivations.

The news was followed by days of protests and blockades in the richest and most historically anti-Massist region of the country. In January, 60% of citizens rejected his imprisonment, according to an opinion poll by Diagnosis Estudios. In response to this social climate, the Legislative Assembly of Santa Cruz approved a law modifying the grounds for temporary absence from office, which would enable Camacho to exercise his public functions from the Chonchocoro prison.

At the same time, another dispute between the ruling party and the opposition is being waged in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly: the judicial reform. This will be a turning point for the elections of the highest authorities of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal to be held in December.

What is the election process like? The Legislative Assembly preselects—by a two-thirds majority—the candidates qualified to compete for the Supreme Court of Justice, the Agro-environmental Court, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal and the Magistrates Council. The magistrates will be elected by simple majority in a process with universal, free, secret and mandatory suffrage. The new members of the ordinary, agro-environmental and specialized jurisdiction, and of the Magistrates Council will serve for 6 years, without the possibility of reelection.

There are currently two active bills. On the one hand, an initiative promoted by a group of “independent jurists” who, by means of a constitutional amendment, propose that the pre-selection of candidates should be made by a committee integrated by members of different political and citizen institutions; the enlargement of the Council of the Magistracy from 3 to 7 members; the restructuring of the judicial career and the regime of disciplinary sanctions; the creation of peace courts in the indigenous jurisdictions; and the increase of the budget of the judicial body. For the moment, the initiative has collected 1.5 million signatures (representing 20% of the electoral roll).

On the other hand, an initiative promoted by the opposition party Comunidad Ciudadana, led by former president Carlos Mesa. This initiative proposes a modification of the process of pre-selection of candidates so that it becomes the competence of the departmental merit tribunals.
With 83% disapproval, Guillermo Lasso is the most unpopular president in Latin America. February’s electoral defeat, in which 80% of the electoral roll participated, dealt a double blow to his image: to a not so expected failure of the constitutional plebiscite, was added the reappearance of Correism in the sub-national elections and, especially, in the most important urban centers.

Let’s start with the constitutional plebiscite. After seeing his possibilities of approving reforms by legislative means truncated and having run up against the limits of governing by means of decrees and declarations of state of emergency, Lasso had bet on a constitutional amendment which, in the light of pre-electoral polls, seemed viable.

In a campaign that mobilized the ruling party and allied forces around the “Yes” and the CONAIE, some sectors of the civil society and Correa’s “NO”, the rejection of each of the questions included in the referendum by more than 55% of the votes buried the last chance of the government to make a change of direction. Lasso made history as the only Ecuadorian president in the last 3 decades to push for a referendum and lose (see Figure 14).

Regarding the sub-national elections, CREO (the party with which Lasso became president) opted from the beginning for a lukewarm electoral strategy in terms of candidacies. As a result, it ended up losing 25 mayoralities and the only province it governed. The counterpart of the defeat of the governing party was the victory of Revolución Ciudadana, the force led by former president Rafael Correa.

Of the 23 provinces, 9 were in the hands of Correa's party, 6 went to Movimiento Pachakutik, 2 to Partido Social Cristiano, while Izquierda Democrática, SUMA, Unidad Popular and Movimiento "Democracia Sí" won one each. Finally, the provinces of Carchi and El Oro were left in the hands of local political movements. At the local level, Revolución Ciudadana won 50 mayoralities, among them those of Quito and Guayaquil, against 28 for PSC, 26 for MP and 25 for CREO.
Defeated in the elections and leading the ranking of negative presidential image, Lasso now faces a motion of censure

The failure in both electoral fronts was the final stitch that plunged the government into a real crisis of governability, taken advantage of by the opposition forces that promoted a new motion of censure against the president for alleged corruption and misappropriation of public funds.

The initiative -which obtained the support of Correism, Partido Social Cristano, Movimiento Pachakutik and Izquierda Democrática- was finally approved with the favorable votes of 104 of the 137 congressmen and later ratified by the Constitutional Court by a majority of 6 votes to 3.

Once again, the possibility of Lasso opting to resort to the constitutional mechanism of dissolution of the Assembly, which we have already analyzed in several previous reports, also known as "muerte cruzada" (cross death), and - with it - the call for new general executive and legislative elections, hovered over the possibility that Lasso would opt to resort to the constitutional mechanism of dissolution of the Assembly, which we have already analyzed in several previous reports. However, the President accepted the Court's decision. For his removal, the Assembly needs to gather the affirmative vote of two thirds of its members (92).
Methodological notes

This monitoring of presidential image compiles surveys on presidential image, level of presidential approval and level of government approval, developed in 18 countries of the region by a group of approximately 90 consulting firms and research centers.

The measurements are integrated by means of a simple average per country for the study period. The data sources are not weighted according to the methodology used, sample size or pollster. The averages corresponding to this two-month period are compared with those of previous two-month periods, using the same methodology. Starting in 2022, the presidential ranking and evolution graphs only aggregate presidential approval data, not government approval data, which will be presented separately, when deemed convenient.

The presidential image rankings include cases that meet the following two criteria: a) they have measurements of presidential approval taken by at least two data sources (consulting firms / research centers); b) they have at least three measurements for the period considered.

Although the goal of this report is to average multiple data sources, its fulfillment is conditioned by the availability of information. For this reason, all those cases in which the figures are based on a single source of data for each period considered are identified. The graph below shows the number of polls included in this number and their distribution.

**Image of Power** is a report produced by Directorio Legislativo’s research team: Felicitas Torrecilla (coordinator), Facundo Cruz (associate researcher), Matías Carpignano (research analyst) and Gastón Pérez Alfaro (research analyst).

*Your feedback and comments are welcome.*

To see the sources of January - February 2023, [click here](#)
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