


Image of power Power of an image

REPORT ON PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RATINGS IN LATIN AMERICA
MAY-JUNE 2021



Executive summary

From May to June **the approval ratings of Iván Duque (Colombia) and Alberto Fernández (Argentina) dropped sharply**, reaching their lowest levels since taking office. Uruguay's President, Lacalle Pou, saw a similar decline as his country struggles with the latest wave of Covid-19, though he is at least one of only six heads of state in the region with support levels of 50% or more.

Interestingly, **the only president to note an improvement in public approval in the last two months was Peru's Francisco Sagasti**, now nearing the end of his term. It follows Pedro Castillo's victory in the run-off elections and ensuing tensions over the results stoked by his rival Keiko Fujimori. According to research from the Institute of Peruvian Studies, Sagasti's approval rose principally among those who class themselves as centrist and opposed to Fujimori.

Although little is still known about Peru's future cabinet, in the aftermath of the elections Castillo and his advisors **hinted he plans to be more moderate than he came across as a candidate**. This is seen as expedient in a country where in recent years, the challenge for a president to see out his term has been on par with getting elected or appointed in the first place. Relations between the executive and legislative branches remain highly strained, with the new government set to have only 36 parliamentary seats out of a total of 130.

Meanwhile, in neighboring Ecuador, **Guillermo Lasso began his term with comparatively high levels of public support**. In that time he has cut ties with his former political party

ally Partido Social Cristiano and sided with Movimiento Pachakutik, which now presides over the National Assembly and indeed has backed the government in some voting so far. The maneuvering comes amid key government proposals that are set for debate in the Assembly, such as on the Law of Freedom of Expression and Communication (which repeals the Organic Law of Communication of Correism), a reform to the Law of Humanitarian Support, and yet to be presented tax reforms.

With an approval score of close to 70%, Lasso may still be in a just-elected honey-moon period though it should be remembered he only obtained 19.74% in the first round of elections. Elsewhere in the region, **other presidents still in the first 18 months of their tenure** - Arce (Bolivia), Abinader (Dominican Republic) and Lacalle Pou (Uruguay) - also **show levels of support of around 50% or more**. The picture changes for those governments passed the first year-and-a-half mark, who save for a few exceptions are less popular the longer they have been in office.

Between May 15 and 16, elections for Constitutional Convention were held in **Chile**. Its outcome looks set to frame the political landscape ahead of the presidential and legislative elections this coming November. With a turnout of 42.5%, **the independent sectors were the big winners, oustripping the ruling right-wing alliance and the center-left**. The Convention was inaugurated on July 4 with Mapuche leader Elisa Loncón presiding.

Jair Bolsonaro is now personally implicated in allegations of corruption linked to the handling of the pandemic and, specifically, to discrepancies in the purchase of vaccines. The Brazilian president already **faces over 120 requests for impeachment**, among them, a "super-impeachment request" pushed by a mixed opposition front. For the time being it appears unlikely these will succeed, even less so a year before the elections and with an approval rate that stands at around 30% and did not change much in the last two months. His prospects for the 2022 elections, however, look bleak.

About this publication. Image of Power provides bimonthly analysis of presidential approval ratings in 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean drawing on survey data from 75 sources. The Presidential Image Ranking only includes those cases where a minimum of three measurements are available over the study period and from at least two different sources.

What are the topics covered in this issue?


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Presidential Image Ranking

May - June 2021

This ranking includes cases where a minimum of three measurements are available over the study period from at least two different sources.

Positive
Negative



How did the image of presidents evolve?

January 2020 - June 2021


Positive
Negative




JAN> FEB MAR> APR MAY> JUN JUL> AGO SEP> OCT NOV> DEC JAN> FEB MAR> APR MAY> JUN



ARGENTINA
Alberto Fernández



BRAZIL
Jair Bolsonaro




BOLIVIA
Luis Arce




Arce took office on 11/08/2020




CHILE
Sebastián Piñera



COLOMBIA
Iván Duque



COSTA RICA
Carlos Alvarado



ECUADOR
Guillermo Lasso




Lasso took office on 05/24/2021



EL SALVADOR
Nayib Bukele



GUATEMALA
Alejandro Giammattei



How did the image of presidents evolve?

January 2020 - June 2021


■ Positivo
■ Negativo




JAN> FEB MAR> APR MAY> JUN JUL> AGO SEP> OCT NOV> DEC JAN> FEB MAR> APR MAY> JUN




HONDURAS
Juan Orlando Hernández




MEXICO
Andrés Manuel López Obrador




NICARAGUA
Daniel Ortega



PANAMA
Laurentino Cortizo



PARAGUAY
Mario Abdo Benítez




PERU
Francisco Sagasti



Sagasti took office on 11/17/2020




DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Luis Abinader



Abinader took office on 08/16/2020



URUGUAY
Luis Lacalle Pou



VENEZUELA
Nicolás Maduro




Duque and Fernández, the worst performing presidents in the last two months

Comparison with the period March-April 2021


Approval levels dropped in Argentina and Colombia, where presidents are at their lowest point of popularity since the beginning of their respective terms. Approval rate also fell in Uruguay, as the health situation quickly deteriorated. Lacalle Pou nevertheless remains above 50%.

Interestingly, the only president to register an increase in his approval rating was Francisco Sagasti, due to leave office on July 28. In Brazil, Chile, Panama, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, levels remained relatively stable compared to the previous two-month period.



The longer the time in office, the lower the popularity?

May - June 2021



This graph combines three data: the average presidential approval rating in the last two months (vertical axis), the number of months elapsed since the beginning of the term (horizontal axis) and the vote share in the first round of elections (bubbles). The trend line would confirm, in principle, the assumption that the administration erodes popular support over time. Out of the 6 presidents with support levels of 50% or


more, 4 are in their first 18 months in office. Presidents with 19 months or more in office show decreasing levels of support the longer they have been in office. The exceptions are El Salvador and Mexico: with 25 and 31 months respectively, Bukele and López Obrador have levels of support above 60%. This trend seems to be independent of the presidents' vote share in the first electoral round.

Only three presidents have more support among women than among men

May - June 2021

The disaggregation of approval levels by gender does not show significant differences. However, only the presidents of Argentina, El Salvador and Peru have higher percentages of support among women than among men. The difference is more pronounced in the case of the

president of Uruguay, Lacalle Pou, who is approved by 45% of the women surveyed, as opposed to 53% of the men. In Brazil, the distances deepen when considering disapproval: 61% of women surveyed reject Bolsonaro's government while among men, the percentage is 48%.



Piñera and Duque, the presidents with the highest levels of rejection among the youngest electorate

May - June 2021

The comparative analysis of support levels by age group, and particularly among the population between 16 and 29 years of age, yields some interesting data. Duque and Piñera are the presidents with the highest levels of rejection among people under 30. In both cases the massive protests that occurred in 2019-2020 and more recently in Colombia, undermined the support and trust of the younger sectors.


In 2017, a study by the Colombian Ministry of the Interior and Universidad de los Andes,

indicated that 6 out of 10 young people distrusted democratic institutions, 7 out of 10 thought that those in power are not interested in what they think and only 15.6% sympathized with a political party.

However, if we compare the approval rate in this group with the general rate, the most pronounced difference arises in Uruguay. Francisco Sagasti's data, on the other hand, show that approval among the population aged 30 years or younger is higher than the general rate.

On a different note, there are several countries in the region where the problem of the low electoral participation of the younger sectors has been raised. In Mexico's 2018 general elections, the estimated voter turnout rate among 18-year-olds was 65%; 57% among 19-year-olds; and approximately 53% among those aged 20 to 29. Also in [Brazil](#), incremental levels of abstention were recorded in the 2018 general elections among the 18-29 age range (from 13% among voters aged 18 to 20 to 21% among those aged 20 to 29), a growth compared to previous elections.


In the [plebiscite](#) held in Chile in November 2020, 56 to 57% of voters aged 18 to 29 voted. This percentage marks, however, a notable jump with respect to the participation in the 2017 general elections ([first](#) and [second](#) round), in which it hovered between 36 and 37%.



What do citizens think of the work of their parliaments?

May - June 2021

This graph compiles the available data for the May-June period. In Ecuador and El Salvador, the composition of the Assembly changed over the study period. In the first case, renovation took place on May 14; in the second, on May 1. The data for Ecuador refer to the incoming Assembly, while those for El Salvador measure the average level of approval of the outgoing Assembly.



The highlights of this issue



With less than three months to go before the legislative primaries, the government's image suffers a sharp decline

Over the past two months Argentina has been embroiled in a series of political and public discussions regarding the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, the vaccination process and high inflation rates. At the end of May, when the country was registering its historical peak of COVID-19 cases, President Alberto Fernandez announced a total closure of activities, including schools.

This decision was resisted by the governors and in particular by the head of government of the City of Buenos Aires who announced that he would not close schools. The **dispute over the autonomy of the City of Buenos Aires** was settled by the Supreme Court of the Nation in favor of the City of Buenos Aires. In an attempt to prevent future conflicts of jurisdiction, the President then promoted a bill to grant powers to the Executive Branch in the management of the pandemic in places of high health risk. Although the proposal was approved by the Senate with a pro-government majority, the debate was blocked in the Chamber of Deputies.

With a more fragmented composition, **negotiations in the Chamber of Deputies are becoming more complicated for the government**, which has even had to struggle to secure the support of some of its

usual allies. This also became evident after the entry of a controversial bill for the reform of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Ministry of Defense, which aimed at making the requirements for the appointment of the heads of both bodies more flexible.

Another point of conflict was related to the vaccination campaign and the criticism of the failed agreement with the Pfizer laboratory, which the opposition attributes to a lack of political will on the part of the government. The considerable advances in the immunization process in the last weeks were not enough to appease the questionings of different sectors, which in the end led the government to adjust the Law of Vaccines against COVID-19 by decree in order to settle the issue.

Less than three months before the legislative primaries, another obstacle faced by the government - so far without much success - is the reduction of inflation, which has already reached 23.7% according to official data. In particular, the decision to close meat exports for 30 days complicated an already deteriorated relationship with the agricultural sector. **Inflation appears in the measurements as one of the main concerns of the population.**

The highlights of this issue



Bolsonaro faces a "super-petition" for impeachment promoted by the entire opposition

The two-month period closes with a new impeachment request, this time presented by an unthinkable front composed of the PT, the PDSB, parties of the left, center-left, and even some leaders of the right, former allies of Bolsonaro. The document details 23 charges, many of them related to the management of the pandemic.

The president is accused of having ignored irregularities in the contract for the purchase of 20 million doses of the Covaxin vaccine, produced by the Indian laboratory Bharat Biotech, after having been personally informed about them. At the same time, in parallel, a journalistic investigation reported that a government official allegedly asked a vaccine supplier for bribes equivalent to US\$1 per dose.

Bolsonaro has already accumulated more than 120 requests for impeachment. What are the chances of his impeachment moving forward? To begin with, it must be admitted by Arthur Lira, president of the Chamber of Deputies and referent of the allied Centrao bloc, who for now has declared that he will not proceed.

If accepted, the removal of the president must first be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Chamber of Deputies, which still does not seem very likely. However, this is not the only front that Bolsonaro will have to overcome. In addition, based on the testimonies collected by the special legislative committee on the handling of the pandemic, the Supreme Court of Justice ordered on July 2 that an investigation be initiated to determine whether the president committed the crime of prevarication by not notifying the judicial authorities about the suspicions surrounding the - now suspended - contract for the purchase of Covaxin.

Although some polls have registered a drop in approval levels coinciding with the investigations in Congress, **the general average for the two-month period continues to be around 30%**. In the latest measurements, more than 50% of the people surveyed evaluated the government as bad or very bad. Notwithstanding the impact on the president's image, recent events do cast serious doubts on his ambitions for the 2022 general elections, while some of his allies are trying to distance themselves and Lula's image is improving.

The highlights of this issue



Hard blow for the ruling party in the constituent and subnational elections

The results of the elections held between May 15 and 16, once again showed the erosion of the traditional parties. The October 2020 plebiscite had already given an indication when 80% of the people who voted in favor of the constitutional reform were in favor of a Convention without the participation of incumbent legislators. In those two days the 155 constituent convention members, regional governors in 13 regions, mayors and councilmen were elected.

Constituent Convention. The big winners of the constituent election were the independent candidates who will occupy more than 30% of the seats, around 50. But, what happened with the party lists and what can be anticipated for the general elections in November? In principle, the ruling coalition and the center-left were the hardest hit.

The Vamos por Chile list of the ruling party and allies (UDI, RN, Evopolis) obtained only 37 of the 155 seats, so it will not have the capacity to veto articles or block agreements between the opposition blocs. Apruebo Dignidad, which brings together a group of consolidated left-wing parties and also newer ones (PC, Frente Amplio, Convergencia Social, Revolución Democrática and others) will have 28 representatives. The center-left (PS, PPD, PL and others) grouped in the Lista del Apruebo obtained 25 seats with 16% of the votes, one of its worst elections.

The Convention was finally installed on July 4, in a day that was not free of disturbances. It will be presided over by Mapuche leader and

academic Elisa Loncón and Jaime Bassa of Frente Amplio, as vice-president.

Sub-national elections. Historically, the elections of mayors and councilors have served as a "thermometer" to anticipate the political preferences of the electorate with a view to the presidential elections. The results were once again adverse for the ruling party. Among the hardest defeats was the governorship of the Metropolitan Region, which will end up being disputed in a second round between two opposition figures (from Frente Amplio-PC and Democracia Cristiana), and the Mayor's Office of Santiago, which was left in the hands of the PC.

Other mayoralities that went to the opposition were those of Maipú, Viña del Mar, Ñuñoa and Estación Central, the first three with victories of Revolución Democrática which emerged in 2012 from the student movement. Frente Amplio also triumphed in the governorship of Valparaíso, the only one that will not be defined in a second round. These results, in sum, reinforce the idea that a left-wing alternative could be gaining ground over the center.

Although the presidential campaign has not yet begun, the political alliances are in the process of defining their candidates. The internal contest of Apruebo Dignidad will be defined between Daniel Jadue (PCCh) and Gabriel Boric (CS); and that of Chile Vamos, between Joaquín Lavín (UDI), Mario Desbordes (RN), Ignacio Briones (Evópoli) and Sebastián Sichel (independent). The Unidad Constituyente alliance, which brings together the center-left parties, did not confirm names.

The highlights of this issue



Duque hits his lowest point of popularity since the beginning of his presidency

After a two-month period marked by the protests that have shaken the country since April 28, the president is at an all-time low in popularity (23%), even lower than his post-2019 National Strike record. **Rejection is particularly high in the population between 16 and 29 years of age**, a range in which the disapproval rate exceeds 80%.

The resistance against the tax reform promoted by the government served as a catalyst of a social discontent with broader and deeper roots. For this reason, neither its withdrawal nor the resignation of the Minister of Economy Alberto Carrasquilla was enough to contain the unrest. Since then, Duque's political gestures regarding an extensive list of demands that includes the comprehensive reform of the police, the implementation of the peace agreements, the protection of social leaders and the reduction of social inequality, have been limited.

Despite announcing an upcoming police reform bill - so far only pushed by the opposition in Congress - **negotiations with**

the National Strike Committee have not progressed. Moreover, the government has opted for a **strategy of dividing the talks into regional tables.** Interior Minister also announced the government's intention to modify the Protocol on the use of public force against social protests, approved only last January, in order to exclude street or road blockades from the definition of peaceful demonstration. In this way, they exploit one of the aspects of the protests that generated the most polarization internally.

Public opinion polls show that more than 80% of the people surveyed consider that the situation is getting worse and **more than half of them disapprove of the way the President handled the protests.** However, they also reflect the wear and tear caused by the protests. Several weeks after they began, between 50 and 56% indicated that they do not want another strike. The first projections for the 2022 general elections also suggest a strengthening of the image of opposition Senator Gustavo Petro, although the prospect is still uncertain.

The highlights of this issue



Legislative elections: the ruling party wins but but sees its representation in the Chamber of Deputies reduced

On June 6, a key election for the future of Mexican politics took place. The 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies for the period September 2021-August 2024, and 30 of the 32 sub-national legislatures were renewed on the same day. In addition, 15 governors were elected. Even though there was a setback in the legislative representation of the ruling party in the Chamber, **MORENA was the first national electoral force with 34% of the votes and strengthened at the sub-national level.**

As of July 6, the National Electoral Institute has not published the final results to define the distribution of the 200 seats elected on a proportional basis. Even so, starting on September 1st, **the ruling alliance is expected to go from 334 to 279 seats** (MORENA from 256 to 197 deputies; PVEM from 11 to 44; PT from 46 to 38). As to the opposition, the PAN will be the main bench with an estimated 111 representatives, while the PRI will be the second with 69.

In short, until now the MORENA bloc had enough votes to reach a simple majority without resorting to its allies. This will not be the case as of September 1. The ruling party and its allies also lost the qualified majority in

the Chamber but **will continue to reach a simple majority as a block**, which will allow them to approve ordinary bills without negotiating with the opposition. The same will not happen in the case of initiatives requiring two thirds of the votes, as is the case of constitutional reforms. With this, some bills proposed by the President, such as the elimination of the National Institute of Transparency, Access to Information and Protection of Personal Data, and other decentralized agencies, lose power.

At the sub-national level, the results were more favorable for MORENA. **The governing party won governorships in 15 of the 11 districts** and its ally PVEM, one more. In addition, it is projected as the first legislative force in at least 17 sub-national legislatures, the number required to ratify any constitutional reform sanctioned by the Congress of the Union.

Among the priorities presented by the ruling party are a tax reform to reduce the tax burden and combat tax evasion, the promotion of private investment and job creation, the provision of free and accessible medicines to vulnerable sectors, and the recognition of the rights of migrants.

The highlights of this issue



NICARAGUA

A wave of politically motivated arrests clears Ortega's path to reelection

General elections are scheduled for November 7 and Daniel Ortega - president since 2007 - seems determined to be re-elected for a fourth consecutive term (or fifth, if we take into account his first term in office between 1985 and 1990).

The "electoral year" began with a [reform to the Electoral Law](#), approved on May 5 by the pro-government majority Assembly, in a process which only lasted about 20 days. Among other points, article 81 inhibits the registration for elective positions of those who do not comply with [Law 1055 of Defense of the Rights of the People](#) and [Law 1040 of Foreign Agents](#), both sanctioned at the end of 2020. The former, in particular, targets those persons who "alter the constitutional order and promote terrorist acts against independence, sovereignty and self-determination", who will be considered as "traitors to the Homeland".

Less than a month after the electoral reform, pre-candidate to the presidency and director of the Violeta Barrios de Chamorro Foundation, Cristiana Chamorro, was arrested under charges of ideological falsehood and money laundering. This was the first of a list of more than 20 cases. In the following weeks, **five other political leaders with presidential aspirations were arrested** on charges of

infringing national sovereignty and self-determination: Arturo Cruz (June 5), Juan Sebastián Chamorro, Félix Madariaga (June 8), Miguel Mora (June 20) and Medardo Maidena (July 5).

Based on the same allegations, the leadership of the Unión Democrática Renovadora-Unamos, a split from the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Suyen Barahona, Hugo Torres, Ana Margarita Vigil and Dora María Téllez) were arrested on June 13. They were later joined by at least two leaders of the opposition front Unidad Nacional Azul y Blanco, created in 2018 (Tamara Dávila, Violeta Granera), two leaders of the peasant movement (Pedro Mena and Freddy Navas) and two others from the student movement (Lesther Alemán and Max Jerez), former ministers, former legislators and a journalist.

The arrests also bring to light ongoing tensions with the private sector which saw relations deteriorate starting in 2018, when a wave of anti-government protests left a toll of 328 people dead. Among those arrested are the former president of the Private Enterprise Council, José Adán Aguerri, and the General Manager of the Production Bank of Nicaragua, Luis Rivas Anduray.

The highlights of this issue



Castillo gives signs that he will be more moderate as president than as candidate

The run-off election held on June 6, ended with the victory of Pedro Castillo by a very narrow margin: 50.12% of the votes, against 49.87% for Keiko Fujimori. Although the count of the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE in Spanish) concluded on June 15, as of July 6, the winner had not yet been officially proclaimed.

Why? Although analysts and observers agree that there was no evidence of fraud, Fujimori questioned the validity of some 200,000 votes. To complicate matters, the National Jury of Elections (JNE in Spanish) in charge of resolving the claim was surprisingly left with one judge less than the four required to rule, after the resignation of magistrate Luis Arce. This put the resolution of the appeals on hold until the designation of his replacement. Beyond this, it is practically ruled out that it will end up confirming the results.

While the sympathizers of both sides took to the streets, Castillo and his team have given signs that would allow to anticipate that he will be more moderate as president than as candidate, at least in economic matters. On the one hand, he appointed as advisor Pedro Francke, an experienced World Bank economist and former official in the governments of Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala.

It was Francke who stated that **there are no plans to move forward with nationalizations, expropriations, price controls or modification of the minimum wage**. They do plan to modify the tax regime of mining companies, credit lines for small agricultural producers and the promotion of temporary employment. On the other hand, **Castillo is interested in keeping Julio Velarde, the president of the Central Reserve Bank** in office since 2006. Anahí Durand, another member of the advisory team who, like Francke, comes from the allied center-left Nuevo Perú party led by Verónica Mendoza, maintained in the same line that the autonomy of the central bank and fiscal stability are things that must be respected.

However, moderation in discourse and actions in view of future governance will have to be negotiated at various levels, and also within the governing party where some dissonant voices have emerged. In particular, the role of its founder and former governor of Junin, Vladimir Cerron, is causing concern. For the time being, **the reform of the Constitution drafted during the government of Alberto Fujimori in 1993 is still on the table**, albeit conditioned by supports that are far from certain. After all, he won the first round with barely 18% of the votes and only has 36 votes secured in Congress, out of a total of 130.

Elections calendar

July - December 2021



NICARAGUA



November 7: presidential and legislative elections

To be elected: President, Vice President and all members of the National Assembly



ARGENTINA



November 14: legislative elections

To be elected: 127 deputies (half of the seats) and 24 senators (one third)



CHILE



November 21: presidential and legislative elections

To be elected: President, Vice President, all members of the Chamber of Deputies and 27 Senators



HONDURAS



November 28: presidential and legislative elections

To be elected: President, Vice-Presidents and all members of Congress

Methodological notes

June 2021

This monitoring of presidential image compiles surveys conducted in 18 countries in the region. The survey includes measurements of the level of presidential approval, presidential image and level of approval of the government's administration from a group of 75 consulting firms and research centers, subject to expansion.

The measurements are integrated by means of a simple average per country for the period surveyed. Data sources are not weighted according to the methodology used, sample size or pollster. The averages for this two-month period are compared with those of previous two-month periods, using the same methodology.


Although the goal of this report is to average multiple data sources, its fulfillment is conditioned by the availability of information.

For this reason, all those cases in which the figures are based on a single source of data for each period considered are identified.

The ranking of presidential image only includes cases with at least three measurements obtained from two or more data sources (consulting firms / research centers) over the period under review..

Since in some cases a considerable level of dispersion between measurements has been noted, Tables 1 and 2 below - also available in the interactive version - disaggregate the values according to data source for the two-month period considered in this report.


Chart 1. Variation in the measurement of Presidents' positive images - May - June 2021



Methodological notes

June 2021

Chart 2. Variation in the measurement of Presidents' negative images - May - June 2021



Sources

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| ■ Acierto Consultora | ■ Datum | ■ Invamer | ■ Poliarquía |
| ■ AtlasIntel | ■ El Financiero | ■ IPEC | ■ Pulso Ciudadano |
| ■ Cadem | ■ Enkroll | ■ IPSOS | ■ UDESA - ESPOP |
| ■ CEDATOS | ■ Equipos | ■ IUOP-UCA | ■ Varela y Asociados |
| ■ CELAG | ■ EXAME Research | ■ JOTA | ■ XP/Ipespe |
| ■ Centro Económico del Cibao | ■ Factum | ■ LPG-Datos | ■ Zuban Córdoba & Asoc |
| ■ CNC | ■ Gallup | ■ Management & Fit | |
| ■ Consulta Mitofsky | ■ GEA-ISA | ■ Nómade | |
| ■ Critería | ■ Giacobbe & Asoc | ■ Opción Consultores | |
| ■ D'Alessio IROL y Berenzstein | ■ Guarumo | ■ Paraná Pesquisas | |
| ■ Datafolha | ■ ICTI-CEC UFG | ■ Perfiles de Opinión | |
| ■ Datexco - Pulso País | ■ IEP | ■ PODER360 | |



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