The effective presence in Venezuela of two presidents is the end-product of a broader, drawn-out splintering of institutions in the country that has affected each branch of government. This cleaving process may have become more pronounced with the emergence of Juan Guaidó, but in fact it can be traced back a lot further and right to the heart of the political system. 

Despite being unable to make their decisions binding, several of the so-called “mirror institutions” that this political splitting process has given rise to have gained a foothold on the international scene. There, they are used as channels of communication and articulation of the political proposals of the Venezuelan opposition.  

The National Constituent Assembly (ANC), in which the legislative powers of the National Assembly (AN) are vested, could be considered the first of these new mirror institutions.  Its decisions, stripped of legal validity since it was considered in contempt of government, have aimed nonetheless to underpin the figure of Juan Guaidó and the strategy of the opposition to position itself internationally. An example is its handling of key initiatives put forward by Guaidó’s government around energy matters or the authorization granted to negotiate PDVSA’s interest payments abroad, which averted a looming default. 

Likewise, it was the NA that was behind the creation for PDVSA of a new ad hoc board of directors, operating in parallel with the Maduro-designated board. A similar situation could arise in the coming months with the possible appointment of an ad hoc board of directors for the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). This would see two governing bodies of the country’s monetary policy, one backed by Maduro’s allies domestically and abroad and the other by those of Guaidó.

In terms of the judiciary, splits there could also be seen prior to Guaidó’s rise. The 33 magistrates who make up the Supreme Court of Justice in exile were sworn in in 2017 by the NA to replace those appointed two years earlier. It is this body that declared last January that the National Assembly is the only legitimate power in Venezuela. For her part, Luisa Ortega Díaz, who in 2017 was dismissed as attorney general by the TSJ and the ANC, has held meetings in different countries in the capacity as attorney general in exile. Juan Guaidó appointed a Special Prosecutor who, operating out of the US, coexists alongside the Attorney General of the Republic. 

During 2019, the number of diplomatic representations in those Latin American countries that recognize Juan Guaidó as interim president has doubled. For example, in Argentina there are two ambassadors: Juan José Valero Nuñez and Elisa Trotta Gamus, appointed by Maduro and Guaidó respectively. The same is evident in the sphere of international organizations, such as the Organization of American States, where the participation of delegates appointed by Guaidó has sparked tensions. 

It is evident, then, that this institutional splitting on display in Venezuela dates back to before the appearance of the two presidential figures. It is a process that has run through and affected the three branches of government. It is used, on the one hand, by the ruling party to make decision-making more unequivocal, and on the other by the opposition to create an institutional framework to support Guaidó’s presidential hopes and secure international backing.